

1962

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

18423

units; Department of the Navy, \$43,880,-000 for 2,195 units; Department of the Air Force, \$69,997,000 for 3,760 units. The units for each of the services include both housing for the continental United States and overseas.

No specific projects are deleted from the housing program, but funds have been made available only for the 7,500 units mentioned above. The Department of Defense and the services are charged with the responsibility of selecting where the housing units will be constructed on the basis of priority and need within the services.

I point this out in the Record because Senators may receive many inquiries about what was done with reference to housing units which had been requested in their respective States. Individual Senators and Members of the House ought not to be charged with the responsibility of getting the housing after it has been requested by the Department of Defense. That adds to the confusion, and it adds to the multiplication of so-called issues which are not pertinent or relevant. These decisions should not be made on that basis. We were willing to allow 7,500 units of housing to be built this year, but we did not

disturb the list except to reduce the money. That leaves the Department of Defense and the services charged with the responsibility of selecting where the housing units shall be constructed, on the basis of priority and need within the services. That is a legislative direction and mandate, as far as it can be carried out in language of this kind. They are charged with the responsibility of establishing the priority list in keeping with the needs of the services.

Under the section, "Department of Defense Family Housing Management Account," the conference committee adopted language placing a limitation upon the amounts of money which can be spent by the services for the construction, operation and maintenance, and debt payments for family housing within each specific service. There is some flexibility, however, given to the Secretary of Defense for the transfer of operation and maintenance appropriations.

Mr. President, I feel that the committee on conference has worked out a very fair and equitable bill. Further, it is my opinion that the bill furnishes for the Department of Defense and the services all the funds necessary to carry

out the construction program required for our national defense commitments; and further, that the total reduction of \$275,615,000 from the amount requested by the Department of Defense and the Budget Bureau does not cut into, nor in any way weaken the bone and muscle of our military program.

I believe this bill establishes the fact that there can be some economy and that there can be some reductions with reference to military expenditures. The Senator from Mississippi believes that we have reached a critical place in our total budget of what our economy can stand, when more effective attention must be given to these military programs. We must never deny any sum that is essential. At the same time we must be certain that it is essential, and that only the essential amount of the request is allowed.

I ask unanimous consent that there may be printed in the Record at this point certain tables which show the estimates and allowances with reference to the program.

There being no objection, the tables were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Appropriations for military construction, fiscal year 1963, showing 1962 appropriations, 1963 estimates, and congressional action

Item	Appropriations, 1962	Budget estimates (revised), 1963	House bill	Senate bill	Conference action	Increase (+) or decrease (-), conference action compared with—		
						Budget estimates, 1963	House bill	Senate bill
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Defense.....	\$27,000,000							
Military construction, Army.....	157,934,000	\$234,421,500	\$197,477,500	\$193,634,000	\$181,272,000	-\$53,149,500	-\$16,205,500	-\$12,362,000
Military construction, Navy.....	192,278,000	306,862,000	214,349,500	196,423,000	193,355,000	-113,507,000	-20,994,500	-3,068,000
Military construction, Air Force.....	498,346,000	944,448,000	863,722,000	860,782,000	847,810,500	-96,638,500	-15,911,500	-12,971,500
Military construction, Defense agencies.....		46,000,000	33,192,000	38,662,000	35,877,000	-10,323,000	+2,485,000	-2,985,000
Loran station, Defense.....	10,000,000	22,000,000	20,000,000	20,000,000	20,000,000	-2,000,000		
Military construction, Army Reserve.....	14,381,000	8,000,000	8,000,000	8,000,000	8,000,000			
Military construction, Naval Reserve.....	7,000,000	7,000,000	7,000,000	7,000,000	7,000,000			
Military construction, Air Force Reserve.....	4,608,000	5,000,000	5,000,000	5,000,000	5,000,000			
Military construction, Army National Guard.....	21,863,750	7,000,000	7,000,000	7,000,000	7,000,000			
Military construction, Air Guard.....	13,276,000	14,000,000	14,000,000	14,000,000	14,000,000			
Total.....	951,690,750	1,594,729,500	1,369,741,000	1,360,501,000	1,310,114,500	-275,615,000	-50,626,500	-31,386,500

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Mississippi to agree to the House amendments to the amendments of the Senate numbered 1, 2, 3, and 5.

The motion was agreed to.

THE U-2 INCIDENT IN RED CHINA— THE PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, during the course of the President's press conference yesterday evening, he referred to the U-2 incident occurring over Red China. I do not know whether the President was indulging in politics, or whether he was merely stating a fact. However, he is reported as having said that the plane that was recently shot down by the Red Chinese had been sold to the Nationalist Chinese in July 1960, during the Eisenhower administration.

I do not know why he should mention that point, except to mention a historic fact. If politics was involved, I see no

reason for it. In that case I would remind the President that his administration has given F-100 fighter planes to Yugoslavia, which certainly is not a friend of ours. The U-2 is not a weapon-carrying airplane, whereas the F-100 is a lethal weapon.

Therefore, if politics is to be involved in the sale of a normal airplane, I think we should also consider the fact that in the President's own administration deadly weapons have been given to a country which is certainly not our friend and that, in addition, we have trained pilots from that country to use such weapons.

Mr. McNAMARA. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GOLDWATER. I yield.

Mr. McNAMARA. Mr. President, I heard the President's broadcast last night. I believe the President used the date 1960, but did not make reference to the Eisenhower administration. The name "Eisenhower" was not used in the press conference.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I did not hear the broadcast. I merely read an article referring to it in this morning's paper. The article states that the sale was arranged in 1960 "that is, during the Eisenhower administration." The headline reads: "Kennedy Pins U-2 Sales On Eisenhower Regime."

I hope the Senator from Michigan is correct. Knowing the newspaper, I am inclined to think that it was the newspaper which made the statement, and not the President.

Mr. McNAMARA. I believe the Senator will find that the Eisenhower regime was not referred to in the press conference. I know the Senator from Arizona wants to be correct.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I certainly do. I do not think politics should be involved in a situation like this. If it was the fault of the newspaper, I expect it to print a retraction of the story tomorrow.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

18424

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

September 14

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hickey in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON CUBA

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, last night the President began his press conference with a statement on Cuba. It is a sober statement which makes clear his complete command of the realities of that situation. It is a statement replete with firmness and wisdom and responsibility. He has the courage to say we will act as our needs may require. He has the courage equally to say that we will not act in an irresponsible fashion out of an irrational fear, or an excess of brashness, or merely out of an understandable but vague desire to "do something."

Mr. President, the Senate might well note the President's words on Cuba. They provide an excellent framework for the consideration of a resolution which will be helpful to him in this situation. I am confident that beyond considerations of partisanship, the members of the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee, who will consider such a resolution during the next few days, will have as their fundamental impulse a desire to close ranks in support of the President. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the statement previously referred to be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Following is the transcript of President Kennedy's news conference yesterday in Washington, as recorded by the New York Times:

I have a preliminary statement.

There has been a great deal of talk on the situation in Cuba in recent days, both in the Communist camp and in our own, and I would like to take this opportunity to set the matter in perspective.

In the first place it is Mr. Castro and his supporters who are in trouble. In the last year his regime has been increasingly isolated from this hemisphere. His name no longer inspires the same fear or following in other Latin American countries.

He has been condemned by the OAS (Organization of American States), excluded from the Inter-American Defense Board and kept out of the Free Trade Association. By his own monumental economic mismanagement, supplemented by our refusal to trade with him, his economy has crumbled and his pledges for economic progress have been discarded.

Along with his pledges for political freedom his industries are stagnating, his harvests are declining, his own followers are beginning to see that their revolution has been betrayed. So it is not surprising that in a frantic effort to bolster his regime he should try to arouse the Cuban people by charges of an imminent American invasion and commit himself still further to a Soviet takeover in the hope of preventing his own collapse.

REPEATS CONCLUSION

Ever since communism moved into Cuba in 1958, Soviet technical and military personnel have moved steadily on to the island in increasing numbers at the invitation of the Cuban Government.

Now that movement has been increased. It is under our most careful surveillance.

But I will repeat the conclusion that I reported last week: that these new shipments do not constitute a serious threat to any other part of this hemisphere.

If the United States ever should find it necessary to take military action against communism in Cuba, all of Castro's Communist-supplied weapons and technicians will not change the result or significantly extend the time required to achieve that result.

However, unilateral military intervention on the part of the United States cannot currently be either required or justified, and it is regrettable that loose talk about such action in this country might serve to give a thin color of legitimacy to the Communist pretense that such a threat exists.

But let me make this clear once again. If at any time the Communist buildup in Cuba were to endanger or interfere with our security in any way, including our base at Guantanamo, our passage to the Panama Canal, our missile and space activities in Cape Canaveral, or the lives of American citizens in this country, or if Cuba should ever attempt to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force against any nation in this hemisphere or become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies.

We shall be alert to and fully capable of dealing swiftly with any such development. As President and Commander in Chief, I have fully authority now to take such action. And I have asked the Congress to authorize me to call up Reserve forces should this, or any other crisis, make it necessary.

In the meantime, we intend to do everything within our power to prevent such a threat from coming into existence.

Our friends in Latin America must realize the consequences such developments hold out for their own peace and freedom, and we shall be making further proposals to them.

Our friends in NATO must realize the implications of their ships' engaging in the Cuban trade. We shall continue to work with Cuban refugee leaders who are dedicated as we are to that nation's future return to freedom.

We shall continue to keep the American people and the Congress fully informed. We shall increase our surveillance of the whole Caribbean area. We shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.

With this in mind, while I recognize that rash talk is cheap, particularly on the part of those who do not have the responsibility, I would hope that the future record will show that the only people talking about a war or an invasion at this time are the Communist spokesmen in Moscow and Havana, and that the American people, defending as we do so much of the free world, will in this nuclear age, as they have in the past, keep both their nerve and their head.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hickey in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE PROPOSED FREEDOM ACADEMY

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, at the present time a bill to establish a new Government agency to be called the Freedom Academy lies before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. In the press there has been a great deal of comment to the effect that efforts may be made to have this bill, S. 822, passed before the adjournment of the present session of this Congress.

So far as I am concerned, the Nation would be better off if the proposed legislation had a quiet demise in the committee to which it has been assigned. If there is one thing we do not need it is another governmental agency to rove the field of foreign policy.

The purpose of the proposed Freedom Academy is to prescribe doctrines by which the United States and friendly nations are to conduct the cold war. It is proposed that a school similar to our service academies be created to develop a scientific method of combating communism and to train Government personnel, private citizens, and foreign students in this science. Of course all of that would be done at considerable expense to our taxpayers. The proposed academy is supposed to be an answer to similar Soviet schools training commissars to serve as political advisers to Soviet military, air, and naval units and foreign Communists in the techniques of subversion; and it is alleged that the proposed Freedom Academy would find answers to the many-faceted problems of the cold war.

Mr. President, do we really desire to ape Communist Russia and to have political commissars attached to units of our Armed Forces? Americans are intelligent; they are not unintelligent cattle to be herded and regimented.

This is an outrageous proposal—to create a so-called Freedom Academy, and to spend millions of the taxpayers' dollars on such a project.

In our struggle with international communism—and it is a serious struggle, indeed, Mr. President—we must employ not only our military strength, but also all of our political, psychological, and economic resources as well. However, the issue is whether the so-called Freedom Academy is necessary or desirable in that connection. Someone conceived the name "Freedom Academy"; and, Mr. President, the fact is that the only attraction of this proposal lies in its name. If bad legislation is proposed, but if it is given an attractive name such as "Freedom Academy," in some minds the proposal becomes a meritorious one. However, Mr. President, this measure is not a meritorious proposal. The struggle with the international Communist conspiracy involves infinitely complex problems. We live in a grim period of international anarchy. The menace posed by the aggressive and ruthless dic-

1962

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

18441

will agree to some reasonable means by which all of us will adhere to conservation practices in fisheries. We do it in the United States. We restrict our own people pretty well in the practice of conservation, but, unfortunately, some of the other countries do not. I think when the importance of such measures to the future of fisheries on the high seas is brought to the attention of many of the countries in which fishing is a great industry, they will come to an agreement with us.

A FORCEFUL U.S. RESPONSE TO SOVIET PROVOCATION IN CUBA

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, Soviet intervention in this hemisphere has had at least two salutary effects: First, it has sharpened our awareness of the dangerous vulnerability of Latin America to Soviet penetration; and, second, it has clarified our determination, by the policy statement of our President and the many utterances of Members of Congress, to resist and defeat aggression not only in other parts of the world, but specifically here in this hemisphere.

Every Member of this body will certainly welcome the timely and forthright declaration of principle by President Kennedy at his news conference yesterday. It would not be surprising if this statement by our President were to become known as the Kennedy doctrine—a modern application of the principles of the historic Monroe Doctrine to the recent developments in our hemisphere.

I ask unanimous consent to place in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks the President's opening remarks at his news conference of yesterday, as well as his answers regarding the circumstances under which we would act under the terms of the Monroe Doctrine and our other treaty commitments to safeguard our security and the security of our neighbors in the Western Hemisphere.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HART in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, in his statement and amplifying remarks, the President raised a number of points which bear repeating and closer study by every informed American citizen. Needless to say, they should also be studied—indeed, memorized—by any potential aggressor, by our Latin American friends, and by our NATO allies. Permit me, then, to summarize in my own words what I look upon as the heart of President Kennedy's message, or the Kennedy Doctrine.

First, Castro's betrayal of his own revolution, and, indeed, of his own people and country, and the economic dislocation brought about by his Marxist-Leninist dogmas have thrown Mr. Castro and Cuba into the clutches of the Soviet bear. Cuba now, under the regime of Dr. Castro, pursues a policy of calculated hostility toward the United States.

Second, Cuba is not now a military threat to the United States, but if it ever becomes one, then no Soviet threats

or Communist weapons will prevent us from nullifying this threat. We shall remove it. As the President clearly stated:

If at any time the Communist buildup in Cuba were to endanger or interfere with our security in any way, including our base at Guantanamo, our passage to the Panama Canal, our missile and space activities at Cape Canaveral, or the lives of American citizens in this country, or if Cuba should ever attempt to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force against any nation in this hemisphere, or become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies.

Those were the words of the President. To my mind, they represent a clear-cut, meaningful declaration of American policy which friend and foe alike should learn, respect, and understand. I am pleased, Mr. President, that what our President had to say in his news conference yesterday is very much the same sort of philosophy and statement as it was my privilege to make in the Senate on Tuesday. I have long believed that we must remove any ambiguity, any lack of clarity from our position on these important matters of national and hemispheric security.

Third, we propose to isolate the Castro virus in this hemisphere through close consultation with the Organization of American States—though always without prejudice to our vital security interests—and we will continue our urgent efforts to dissuade our NATO allies from allowing their ships to conduct the traffic in chains for Cuba.

Fourth, as the President himself put it:

We shall continue to work with Cuban refugee leaders who are dedicated as we are to that nation's future return to freedom. We shall continue to keep the American people and the Congress fully informed. We shall increase our surveillance of the whole Caribbean area. We shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.

Every American—and especially every Member of Congress, which bears a unique responsibility for shaping public opinion—should heed the President's call for sanity in the midst of crisis. We must justify his confidence “that the American people, defending, as we do, so much of the free world, will, in this nuclear age, as they have in the past, keep both their nerve and their head.” That is why I particularly urge favorable consideration of the resolution introduced yesterday by the majority leader, which expresses our determination to prevent, by all necessary means, the export of Castro subversion and revolution.

Finally, Mr. President, I wish to share with my colleagues an especially perceptive editorial which appeared in this morning's Washington Post and Times Herald, entitled “Soviet-Cuban Crisis.” With objectivity, sound scholarship, and a thorough understanding of current policy implications, the Post editorial lays to rest—I hope for the last time—the notion that, in Mr. Khrushchev's words, the Monroe Doctrine is “dead.”

To the contrary, the Monroe Doctrine is still an irreplaceable declaration of

current U.S. policy toward the weak and vulnerable nations at our doorstep. To be sure, circumstances have changed since 1823, when the Monroe Doctrine was issued.

I add, it was then the Czarist Russian threat to this hemisphere to which the Monroe Doctrine was directed. Today the Kennedy doctrine is directed to the Soviet Communist threat to this hemisphere. In both instances, the threat has come from Moscow. We ourselves have intervened in Europe's affairs to save the European democratic heritage. Yet our worldwide commitments have in no wise invalidated our legitimate and vital concern for our physical security. Ultimately, we must rely on ourselves for the neutralization of any foreign threat to this security—just as we did during World War II, when Nazi penetration of Latin America assumed menacing proportions. Let the world know that this is our steadfast resolve in the ominous situation that faces us at this juncture.

I ask unanimous consent that the editorial to which I have referred may be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SOVIET-CUBAN CRISIS

It is a curious irony of history that the Monroe Doctrine, which was enunciated in 1823 to keep Imperial Russia and her associates in the holy alliance out of America, has again been directly challenged, after 139 years, by another Russian imperialism.

This country has not directly invoked the Monroe Doctrine in an explicit warning to the Soviet Union of the sort it has hitherto sent to many European powers. The reason is not far to seek. The Monroe Doctrine, in one formulation after another, up to World War I, was made to rest on two cardinal points: that this country would regard intervention in the Western Hemisphere as an unfriendly act and that the United States did not interfere in the quarrels or affairs of Europe. The changed posture of the United States in European affairs may not have invalidated the Doctrine, but it has outmoded one part of it and made it impractical to assert that the inviolability of the Western Hemisphere is a corollary of our own noninterference in the quarrels of Europe. Were this country to make this assertion now, it would be reminded of our intervention in two World Wars, our assistance to European nations, and our economic and military aid around the world.

Yet, if it would be inconsistent to invoke both premises of the Monroe Doctrine, it is equally inconsistent to argue that the whole theory of the Monroe declaration has been outdated and the practical necessity of maintaining the inviolability of the Western Hemisphere has disappeared. It can be said with truth and consistency that the safety of this country demanded that potential enemies be kept out of this hemisphere in 1823, and that the necessities of defense in 1962 demand more, not less precaution and require resistance, not only on the soil of this hemisphere but on the lands of independent nations all over the world who wish to maintain their national integrity. The Monroe Doctrine branded as an unfriendly act European conquest or interpositions that would involve “controlling in any other manner” the destiny of American nations. Without abandoning that doctrine, the United States has been, in fact, if not by proclamation, asserting that in the smaller world of 1962 the conquests of small and

independent nations around the world also represent acts "unfriendly" in disposition toward this country. The support of the United States has been extended, by the fact of our aid and assistance, to independent nations everywhere, in a candid acknowledgment that it is no longer sufficient to the safety of our "system of government" to allow conquest to come to the shores of the Western Hemisphere before resisting it. The experience of two World Wars counsels us to erect our defenses at more remote points; but nothing that has happened in those two military encounters or the cold war that has followed World War II, suggests that this experience advises also the abandonment, at the same time, of defensive perimeters nearer home, prescribed when the Nation was not strong enough to keep its enemies farther away.

The Soviet intervention in Cuba is no less dangerous, no less objectionable, and no less unfriendly in disposition toward this country, than were the Russian colonial ambitions on the Pacific coast in 1823. The ships and arms that Khrushchev has sent to Cuba are as menacing as the fleet that Emperor Alexander gave to Spain to help her subdue her former American colonies in 1818. This country resisted Russia then; it must resist its penetration of the Western Hemisphere now.

The relations of the United States to Europe have altered, to be sure, but these changes have not eliminated this Nation's practical concern about the presence of a hostile European power in Cuba or elsewhere in the hemisphere. Daniel Webster, in a House debate in 1826, when the Monroe Doctrine was being attacked, defined its practical meaning in these terms:

"A member has said that if Spain chose to transfer the island to any other power she has a right to do so, and we here cannot interfere to prevent her, I must dissent from this opinion. The rights of nations in matters of this kind are much modified by circumstances. Because France or Great Britain could not rightfully complain of the transfer of Florida to us, it does not follow that we could not complain of the cession of Cuba to one of them. The transfer of Florida to us was not dangerous to the safety of either of these nations, nor fatal to any of their great and essential interests. Proximity of position, neighborhood, whatever augments the power of injuring and annoying, very properly belong to the consideration of all cases of this kind. What might otherwise never be thought of is justified for these reasons and on these grounds."

To state our concern and our interest in Cuba's independence, to declare our objection to its transfer to any hostile power, to insist that European powers participating in such ventures are guilty of acts unfriendly to us—these diplomatic steps are not the equivalent of instant resort to arms. It is one of the anomalies of history that although this country frequently has invoked the Monroe Doctrine it has not yet had to resort to arms to gain its acceptance by European powers. It withheld military intervention for 5 long years while the Maximilian regime rose and fell in Mexico from 1862 to 1867. War is not the only device open to an affronted power, even though it is the ultimate device.

It would salve all our frustrations, gratify all our angry impulses, soothe our ruffled pride, and lay balm to our burning sense of affront and injustice to fly to arms against an intervention so plainly filled with hostile intent. If and when it is apparent that the threat to our interests is too instant to be deferred, too dangerous to be tolerated, too imminent to be countenanced another moment,

military steps may yet have to be taken. Despite all the clamor, however, for any peaceful country, they must be a last and not a first resort.

There is reason to believe that the dangers to us, whatever they are, do not multiply so swiftly that reliance cannot be put first on lesser means. While the proximity of hostile power is still a factor of modern war, it has lost some of the pertinence it had more than a century ago and, in a thermonuclear age, military peril is not as measurably increased by proximity as once it was. Apart from the direct military threat, there is the menace of the threat of Soviet Cuba expanding to the rest of the Caribbean and to other South American countries. That threat can be met by military means without attacking Cuba itself. No measures of containment should be neglected. Under the circumstances now existing in Cuba, the overthrow of any government in the Caribbean, by force or violence, and the institution of any irregular regime likely to be supported subsequently by Soviet arms is a threat to the law and order of this hemisphere. This Nation must be prepared to resist such a threat instantly, with our American allies if possible, without them if necessary. The arms buildup in Cuba itself could take on a coloration that would constitute a measurable increase in the thermonuclear capability of the Soviet Union against us. The island of Cuba must be kept under a close surveillance to detect such a development and if there is any evidence that medium-range missile sites are being built, to bring most of the United States within the first-strike range of Russian thermonuclear power, the military response of this country must be prompt, decisive and overwhelming.

Meanwhile, without any further anxieties about thrusting Castro into Soviet arms, or any further misgivings about support in the Western Hemisphere, every diplomatic device that will make more difficult the path of Soviet Cuba must be pursued without flagging. With the fullest respect for our every international obligation, we have every right to seek by all legitimate means, the frustration of Soviet-Cuban ambitions and hopes.

This country, moreover, is under no legal or moral compulsion to obstruct or deny the efforts of anti-Communist movements of Cuban citizens elsewhere in the Caribbean, in the exercise of their natural rights, to overthrow the foreign tyranny that has been imposed upon them by stealth and fraud and force and violence. Such freedom movements, throughout the history of this country, have attracted open sympathy and the financial support of American citizens, and no government ever has or ever will have the power to prevent such manifestations of American respect for the courage and daring of those willing to fight for the freedom of their own land when it is under the occupation of a foreign foe.

This must be our posture for the present. Rash and impulsive military adventures, much as they may be clamored for, are to be resisted as long as direct military safety permits and so far as the integrity of the other American countries allows. The brave Cuban people who have thrown off both foreign and domestic tyrants before, may yet deal with this crisis in an effective way, for all their immediate helplessness. Soviet bluster must not frighten us from the interposition of instant military force against the spread of this danger elsewhere in the hemisphere or against any gathering of offensive weapons on Cuba, and it should not deter us from making adequate preparation for the day when American aid can help Cubans restore their country's independence and revive its prosperity.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I am convinced, that firm leadership on the part of our country, with our neighbors in Latin America and in the councils of the Organization of American States—combined with our determination to protect the freedom and security of this hemisphere, and our determination to work cooperatively with our friends in Latin America—will gain for us the cooperation and assistance that we need in this endeavor.

I am also of the mind, Mr. President, that we must do what needs to be done. We ought not to be overly concerned about the complaints of some people or of some nations. We are not engaged in a popularity contest. We have responsibilities for freedom at home in this country and in many other areas of the world. We are engaged in a monumental and momentous struggle with the international Communist movement. The only way I know in which we can win that struggle is to bring with us as many friends as we possible can who are dedicated to common objectives and common purposes.

Above all, friends and allies need leadership. The leadership given by President Kennedy and so clearly and unmistakably restated in his press conference of yesterday and in his statement to the American people and the world, will bear good fruit. That leadership will bring the response the President has hoped for—the response of stalwart men and of strong nations which seek to preserve freedom in this hemisphere and in other parts of the world.

Following is the transcript of President Kennedy's news conference yesterday:

EXHIBIT 1

I have a preliminary statement.

There has been a great deal of talk on the situation in Cuba in recent days both in the Communist camp and in our own, and I would like to take this opportunity to set the matter in perspective.

In the first place, it is Mr. Castro and his supporters who are in trouble. In the last year, his regime has been increasingly isolated from this Hemisphere. His name no longer inspires the same fear or following in other Latin American countries. He has been condemned by the OAS, excluded from the Inter-American Defense Board, and kept out of the (Latin American) Free Trade Association. By his own monumental economic mismanagement, supplemented by our refusal to trade with him, his economy has crumbled, and his pledges for economic progress have been discarded, along with his pledges for political freedom. His industries are stagnating, his harvests are declining, his own followers are beginning to see that their revolution has been betrayed.

So it is not surprising that in a frantic effort to bolster his regime he should try to arouse the Cuban people by charges of an imminent American invasion, and commit himself still further to a Soviet take-over in the hope of preventing his own collapse.

Ever since communism moved into Cuba in 1958, Soviet technical and military personnel have moved steadily onto the island in increasing numbers at the invitation of the Cuban Government.

Now that movement has been increased. It is under our most careful surveillance. But I will repeat the conclusion that I reported last week, that these new shipments

1962

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

18443

do not constitute a serious threat to any other part of this hemisphere.

If the United States ever should find it necessary to take military action against communism in Cuba, all of Castro's Communist-supplied weapons and technicians would not change the result or significantly extend the time required to achieve that result.

However, unilateral military intervention on the part of the United States cannot currently be either required or justified, and it is regrettable that loose talk about such action in this country might serve to give a thin color of legitimacy to the Communist pretense that such a threat exists. But let me make this clear once again:

If at any time the Communist buildup in Cuba were to endanger or interfere with our security in any way, including our base at Guantanamo, our passage to the Panama Canal, our missile and space activities at Cape Canaveral, or the lives of American citizens in this country, or if Cuba should ever attempt to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force against any nation in this hemisphere, or become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies.

We shall be alert, too, and fully capable of dealing swiftly with any such development. As President and Commander in Chief I have full authority now to take such action, and I have asked the Congress to authorize me to call up Reserve Forces should this or any other crisis make it necessary.

In the meantime, we intend to do everything within our power to prevent such a threat from coming into existence. Our friends in Latin America must realize the consequences such developments hold out for their own peace and freedom, and we shall be making further proposals to them. Our friends in NATO must realize the implications of their ships engaging in the Cuban trade.

We shall continue to work with Cuban refugee leaders who are dedicated as we are to that nation's future return to freedom. We shall continue to keep the American people and the Congress fully informed. We shall increase our surveillance of the whole Caribbean area. We shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.

With this in mind, while I recognize that rash talk is cheap, particularly on the part of those who do not have the responsibility, I would hope that the future record will show that the only people talking about a war or an invasion at this time are the Communist spokesmen in Moscow and Havana, and that the American people defending as we do so much of the free world, will in this nuclear age, as they have in the past, keep both their nerve and their head.

OFFENSIVE ACTION

Question. Mr. President, coupling this statement with the one of last week, at what point do you determine that the buildup in Cuba has lost its defensive character and become offensive? Would it take an overt act?

Answer. I think if you read last week's statement and the statement today, I made it quite clear, particularly in last week's statement when we talked about the presence of offensive military missile capacity or development of military base and other indications which I gave last week, all those would, of course, indicate a change in the nature of the threat.

MONROE DOCTRINE

Question. Well, Mr. President, in this same line, have you set for yourself any rule or set of conditions at which you will determine that the existence of an offensive rather than

a defensive force in Cuba, and in that same connection in your reading of the Monroe Doctrine, how do you define intervention? Will it require force to contravene the Monroe Doctrine or does the presence of a foreign power in any force, but not using that force in this hemisphere, amount to contravention of the Doctrine?

Answer. Well, I have indicated that if Cuba should possess a capacity to carry out offensive action against the United States, that the United States would act. I have also indicated that the United States would not permit Cuba to export its power by force in the hemisphere. The United States will make appropriate military judgments after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others, after carefully analyzing whatever new information comes in, as to whether that point has been reached where an offensive threat does exist. And at that time the country and the Congress will be so notified.

LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I wish to make an announcement. I am hopeful that every Senator will read it in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD over the weekend.

On behalf of the Senate leadership, I wish to give notice to the Senate as to the possibility of action, either Monday or soon thereafter, on the bills to which I shall now refer. I am hopeful that our colleagues will be present to attend to consideration of these bills.

Calendar No. 1741, H.R. 8181, the National Fisheries Center bill.

Calendar No. 1775, S. 3313, to increase the borrowing authority for the District of Columbia.

Calendar No. 1881, S. 2138, relating to payments to counties for wildlife refuges, which is the pending business.

Calendar No. 1947, House Joint Resolution 489, to provide protection for the golden eagle.

Calendar No. 1957, H.R. 575, relating to the Baker Federal reclamation project, Oregon.

Calendar No. 1963, H.R. 11164, the Quincy Columbia Basin Irrigation District bill.

Calendar No. 1977, H.R. 11665, relating to the National School Lunch Act.

Calendar No. 1869, H.R. 10541, the mass inoculation bill.

Calendar No. 2015, H.R. 12628, the act to amend title V of the Housing Act of 1949, in order to provide low and moderate cost housing, both urban and rural, for the elderly. This is very important proposed legislation. All Senators interested in it should be on notice it will be called up for action very shortly.

I also call the attention of Senators to the fact that it is our intention very shortly to move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 1958, H.R. 12135, the Highway Act.

Senators interested in particular proposed legislation are on notice that all these bills have been cleared by the policy committee, and they will be acted upon, and promptly.

In addition, other bills will be brought before the Senate, to which objections have been registered.

The calendar of the bills which rests on the desk of the majority leader contains a list of all bills cleared by the

respective committees and placed on the calendar, with the names of Senators who have asked that certain bills be held up, and a list of bills to which objection has been made by individual Senators.

I speak for myself in this instance, Mr. President. The time has arrived, if we are ever to conclude the business in the Senate, for Senators who have objections to bills to be present to object to them in debate, and not merely rely on objections by written word in the calendar. Otherwise we shall not be able to complete the business of the Senate.

While it is fairly well understood that Congress may well be in session until the first week in October, it may be here longer, unless bills can be acted upon promptly. Therefore, as the assistant majority leader, and one who has some responsibility, I am asking Senators to be on notice that the bills to which I have referred will be called up for debate and decision.

A number of other bills will also be called up during the coming week. I would like Senators who are interested to be on notice that, starting with Calendar No. 2007 through Calendar No. 2014, certain bills reported from the Committee on Finance will be called up. Some Senators have indicated their desire to have those bills held up. Those bills have been held up. They are going to be acted upon. On behalf of the leadership of the Senate, I give notice now that those bills will be called up for action within the next few days.

The end of the session is approaching. Senators having objections to or interest in measures on the calendar should be prepared to be present in the Senate—on the Senate floor—to contest or support those measures.

I recognize that committee duties are pressing and important, but so is floor action on bills that have been cleared by committees, reported to the Senate, and placed on the calendar for action.

In order to accommodate a number of Senators who are unable to be present today, the leadership has canceled its plans to bring up various measures on the calendar. However, I express the hope that those Senators will be equally accommodating to the leadership in the days to come. Senators should be prepared for consideration of any measure reported and on the calendar.

I repeat that statement. Senators should be prepared for consideration of any measure that is reported and on the calendar, and particularly bills that have been cleared by the policy committee.

An announcement will be made to the members of the policy committee as to our next meeting, so that we can proceed for further clearance of bills in the policy committee.

ADJOURNMENT TO 10 A.M. MONDAY

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, pursuant to the order previously entered, I now move that the Senate stand in adjournment until 10 o'clock a.m. Monday.

18444

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

September 14, 1962

The motion was agreed to; and (at 1 o'clock and 33 minutes p.m.) the Senate adjourned, under the order previously entered, until Monday, September 17, 1962, at 10 o'clock a.m.

CONFIRMATIONS

Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate September 14, 1962:

U.S. ASSAY OFFICE

Paul J. Maguire, of New York, to be assayer of the U.S. assay office at New York, N.Y.

U.S. NAVY

Vice Adm. Harold T. Deutermann, U.S. Navy, to be U.S. representative of the Mil-

tary Staff Committee of the United Nations as a senior member, in accordance with title 10, United States Code, section 711.

The following-named officers for appointment to the grade indicated while serving, pursuant to title 10, United States Code, section 5231, having been designated for commands and duties determined by the President to be within the contemplation of said section:

To be vice admirals

Rear Adm. Paul D. Stroop, U.S. Navy.

Rear Adm. Horacio Rivero, Jr., U.S. Navy.

Rear Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, U.S. Navy.

The following-named officers for appointment to the grade indicated on the retired list, in accordance with title 10, United States Code, section 5233:

To be vice admirals

Vice Adm. Charles Wellborn, Jr., U.S. Navy.

Vice Adm. Robert B. Pirie, U.S. Navy.

Vice Adm. Clarence E. Ekstrom, U.S. Navy.

IN THE ARMY

The nominations beginning Irma L. Jaakola to be major, Army Medical Specialist Corps, and ending Larry R. Tinberg to be second lieutenant, which nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on August 27, 1962.

IN THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS

The nominations beginning Larry R. Croll to be ensign in the Navy, and ending Thomas L. Cusick to be first lieutenant in the Marine Corps, which nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on September 5, 1962.

1962

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

A6833

ner and my introductory remarks were as follows:

INTRODUCTION BY HON. EDWARD A. GARMATZ OF CONGRESSMAN HERBERT C. BONNER, CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, AT PROPELLER CLUB DINNER, SEPTEMBER 12, 1962, SHERATON BELVEDERE HOTEL

I am very honored, indeed, to be accorded the privilege to present tonight's principal speaker on the occasion of this Defender's Day dinner of the Propeller Club, port of Baltimore.

To those of us who are interested in the American merchant marine, the presence of this distinguished Member of Congress with us this evening, is a source of genuine pleasure and an occasion to which we have eagerly looked forward.

A Member of the House of Representatives for the past 23 years, and chairman of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries for the past 8, this outstanding legislator has gained the cooperation and earned the respect of Members on both sides of the aisle, Republicans and Democrats alike.

His record of progress and achievement in the area of maritime legislation is one which has attained for him a stature that is recognized not only nationally, but—if you please—internationally as well.

To recount all of his accomplishments would require much time; therefore, I shall endeavor to be brief, touching on some of the highlights of his service.

Because of his dedicated interest to, and his keen insight in merchant marine affairs, he has been responsible for and instrumental in the enactment of legislation ranging from the Small Boat Act of 1958—a major contribution in the field of small boat safety—to the construction of superliners and the nuclear-powered merchant vessel.

Also, we can point with justifiable pride that under his chairmanship, we have seen the development of mortgage insurance which is so vital to the rebuilding of our merchant marine. We can likewise point to his sponsorship of legislation for the construction of a nuclear-powered icebreaker.

It is fitting and proper, therefore, that his activities in these varied fields have been recognized by the Ole Evinrude Award and the Robert L. Hague Award, which stand out among the many honors bestowed upon him.

And, I should like to add, that those of us who have had the pleasure of working with him, are the first to acknowledge that these honors are fully deserved. May I say that my personal association with him for nearly 16 years has more than convinced me that he is the "propeller"—the guiding force—in the work of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

The American merchant marine and shipping industry are indeed fortunate to have a man of his exceptional caliber and attainments to safeguard their interests in the face of growing competition.

Ladies and gentlemen, I am extremely proud to present to you my respected and devoted colleague, my chairman, and our friend, the Honorable HERBERT C. BONNER, of North Carolina.

Cuba
The Cuban Situation

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, September 14, 1962

Mr. LIPSCOMB, Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks I submit for

inclusion in the RECORD the September 11, 1962, issue of the Vision Letter which is a weekly analysis of Latin American Affairs by Vision, Inc., New York, N.Y.

With the Cuban situation worsening practically daily, and with claims and counterclaims flying through the air, it is time for clear-cut assessments of the Cuban problem as to basically what issues are involved, what the responsibilities are, and what must be done.

I believe the Vision Letter presents a very good analysis of the Cuban problem which should be brought to the attention of the American people.

Of interest is an introductory note to the editorial by the editors of Vision telling of their overall policy with reference to commenting on the Cuban matter and the reasons they feel compelled to speak.

The editors say:

Until today, the editors of Vision have refrained from harsh criticism of the Kennedy administration's handling of hemisphere affairs out of a sense of restraint and the recognition that a new government deserves time to "shake down" its operation. However, the gathering storm in Cuba and the apparent futility of the Government's attempts to cope with it have reached a point where it becomes our duty and responsibility to speak.

The Vision Letter on Cuba follows:

[From the Vision Letter, Sept. 11, 1962]

CUBA, THE HEMISPHERE, AND THE FAILURE OF LEADERSHIP IN WASHINGTON

Candidate John Fitzgerald Kennedy, in 1960, was outraged that international communism had reached Cuba—"just 90 miles off our shores." As an issue, it helped put him in the White House. Today, 20 months after the New Frontier was staked out in Washington, Cuba is still there—still Communist, still 90 miles away, but now armed to the teeth and pointed like a spear at the heart of America.

For more than a year and a half the people of the United States have waited for a straight answer to this one vital question: When are we going to drive the Communists out of Cuba?

Since the failure of the Bay of Pigs landing in April of last year, the administration has given no honest answer. A year ago the word was "watchful waiting." Last week it was "close surveillance."

But what have we been watching and what are we surveying? And what has happened in this hemisphere over the past 20 months while Washington has been focusing its microscope? The answers are shocking.

Important nations, once staunch U.S. friends, have drifted toward neutralism. Despite administration efforts to quarantine Cuba, leftwing elements throughout the hemisphere have continued to receive moral and material support from Fidel Castro. The young in every Latin American country continue to be contaminated by his image and ideology.

The administration's failure to provide its Latin American friends with the leadership they expect has surrendered by default the political initiative to the growing ranks of ultranationalists, leftwingers, and other extremists. Coming at a time of spectacular Soviet political and scientific advances, this seeming U.S. paralysis is driving impressionable Latin American masses first into neutralism and, ultimately, the arms of the Kremlin.

Those who had been our friends in former times—and could be again—are becoming frustrated and disgusted. Unable alone to halt the trend to the left, they are beginning to grow cold to our ineffectual pleading, rid-

culing our policies in public forums, and using the threat of closer relations with the Soviet as blackmail to elicit economic concessions.

In this poisonous atmosphere our vaunted Alliance for Progress, which was to have been the salvation of the hemisphere, is "dying on the vine"—a fate which Washington's wishful thinkers had reserved for Communist Cuba.

In Cuba itself, Castro's band of bearded irregulars has been turned into a modern army of 300,000 men. The Cuban people are killed and held in a slavery more tyrannical than that of any other Soviet satellite. Russian technicians and equipment have built bases capable of hampering the U.S. radar-defense system, of interfering with our space program, of conducting long-range electronic intelligence, and, if necessary, hurling even medium-range missiles deep into the United States from the comfortable distance of 90 miles away.

This is the factual, undeniable political and strategic picture of our hemisphere today. But incredible as it may seem, some administration spokesmen still proclaim the success of the quarantine policy—because, it is said, Latin America has now seen Castro's true face and will, therefore, not follow Cuba into the Soviet web. Incredibly, too, Democratic leaders are trying to alibi this administration's ineptness by accusing Eisenhower of allowing the Communists to establish a toehold in Cuba.

All this is dangerous nonsense. The time has come for plain talk, not out of political partisanship, but out of due regard for the interests and even survival of our country. In this hemisphere, Kennedy's policies are not winning in Cuba and they are not winning anywhere else. While Cuba is central to the entire problem, it is not the only factor. To see this and why, it is only necessary to review the record of this administration's promise and performance.

President Kennedy came into office at a time when a steadily deteriorating U.S.-Latin American relationship, owing to neglect under both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, was being rectified by President Eisenhower in his last year in office. In successive moves, Ike had already announced a half-billion-dollar aid program for Latin America as a forerunner of the Alliance, had finally installed a brilliant, able Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs in the person of Thomas Mann, and had shown insight and courage by setting the plans for a Cuban invasion.

From the day of his inauguration, however, Kennedy has failed dismally to live up to his promise for new talent and new activity in our Latin American policies. Decision-making became a compromise of views among such men as Adlai Stevenson, Chester Bowles, Arthur Schlesinger and, in the case of Cuba, New York Times editorialist Herbert Matthews who, until recently, was still splitting hairs over whether the Cuban revolution was "doctrinally Communist" or merely "under heavy Communist influence". Finally, Kennedy assigned a young campaign aid, Richard Goodwin, as his personal watchdog. Goodwin's credentials: he invented the term "Alliance for Progress".

Fanning out from center, things went from bad to worse: J.F.K.'s brother Teddy, now a senatorial candidate, got a factfinding tour; Jimmy Symington, son of the Senator from Missouri, took his guitar on a food for peace mission; Igor Cassini, a New York cafe society columnist, was a cloak and dagger go-between with the Dominican Republic.

Today, despite the worth of some of the men now at the top, the crisis of leadership continues. Who really runs our hemisphere affairs—Edwin Martin, Teodoro Moscoso, Fowler Hamilton, Dean Rusk? No one man has a final say up to the President himself. But the lack of leadership only underscores a more dangerous failure: an inability to understand our historic relationship with the

A6834

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

September 14

Latin American states both singly and collectively.

It is this inability to understand Latin American facts of life that has led to the complete misunderstanding of the military role in Latin American history, culminating in the fiasco of suspended relations with Peru; the cliché-ridden over-emphasis on miracle reforms—land, tax, etc.—that were to provide an overnight solution to all development problems, but instead have frightened away domestic and foreign investment capital; the naive pandering to Latin American "resentments" as interpreted by leftwing critics; and the weak, hat-in-hand quest for inter-American action to thwart the Communist intrusion into the Caribbean.

Worst of all has been the administration's inability or unwillingness to comprehend that when the chips are down, slogans and airy ideals are no substitute for the reality of power and the will to use it. In a recent dispatch from Washington, New York Herald Tribune columnist Marguerite Higgins wrote that "Americans of great stature, both in and out of government, Democrats as well as Republicans, are now asking, whether President Kennedy will preside over the decline of America as a great power."

The future will tell whether this is unduly alarmist, but it is not unduly alarmist to state that the decline of America as a hemisphere power has already set in and that this decline cannot be stopped as long as Castro is in Cuba and Cuba a Soviet base. For what goes for Laos and Berlin goes for Cuba, too; namely, that timidity—or caution as it is referred to among the White House liberals—in the face of Soviet challenge only invites further Communist encroachment, and that firmness forces a Soviet backdown.

Soviet prestige rises at the same rate as U.S. prestige drops. In Latin America today U.S. prestige is dropping rapidly every day that Castro remains in power. The Kremlin and Cuban propaganda machines grind out the same message throughout the hemisphere: that the future lies with the tough-minded Soviets rather than with the decadent and luxury loving Yankees.

In a region that puts great stress on being "muy macho"—very manly—this is a telling argument. We should not forget that the administration was seriously misreading Latin American political opinion when it reached the conclusion that Latin Americans will not tolerate any modification of the principle of nonintervention no matter how politically necessary this may be. Latin Americans, including such leaders as Quadros, Lopez Mateos and Frondizi, were not shocked by the Bay of Pigs—but by its failure. There was no official reaction during the 2 days in which the issue was in doubt. It was only when the invasion failed that the reaction started. And the administration's caution because of possible Soviet countermoves in several other danger spots throughout the world is regarded as plain softness.

At the moment of writing, the Soviet Union is blatantly testing U.S. nerve by threat of nuclear war should we decide to put the Monroe Doctrine and the existing inter-American defense treaties to a test. In this context the solutions offered by the administration in recent days—that is, to isolate Castro even further economically with hopes that the discontent in Cuba will blossom into revolution; to blockade the island; and to convoke another foreign ministers' meeting—are either naive or foolhardy. The first is plainly ludicrous, the second is a case of locking the barn after the cow has been stolen, and the third would only cater to even more irresponsible fence sitting by Latin American governments.

With the Russian threat in the open, it is clearly too late for wordy and meaningless OAS palliatives. Nor can we be cowed into

inaction by the possibility that we may have to engage in strategic and political struggles on other fronts. The argument is already being advanced that we cannot address the Cuban problem for fear the Russians will repay in kind in Berlin or elsewhere. This is mealy-mouthed defeatism. It is patently obvious that if the Kremlin used similar reasoning, it would have had to give up its present incursion into Cuba—for fear of U.S. counteraction in, say, Albania or Germany.

On April 20 of last year, 3 days after the Cuban invasion began, President Kennedy in a speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors stated that U.S. "restraint is not inexhaustible," and that the United States does not intend to abandon Cuba to communism. He said: "Should it ever appear that the inter-American doctrine of noninterference merely conceals or excuses a policy of nonaction if the Nations of this hemisphere should fail to meet their commitments against outside Communist penetration, then I want it clearly understood that this Government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations, which are the security of our Nation."

We believe the time to meet the primary obligations of which the President spoke has now arrived. Kennedy must make it known to the people of this country and to the Nations of this hemisphere that he is willing to accept the challenge and will now move to reverse the policies of inaction and retreat. He must also state clearly that he no longer considers a Soviet base in this hemisphere a matter for the OAS or a subject for international debate, but one for the United States alone to resolve.

The technicalities—whether to act through the instrumentality of a Caribbean NATO, a Cuban Government-in-exile, or U.S. power alone—are up to the President and his military advisers. But as a first step and without further delay, the President must announce that he is taking personal charge of this threat and that it is his own determination as Commander in Chief to eliminate the Russian beachhead from this hemisphere.

Cuba

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. BOB WILSON

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, September 14, 1962

Mr. WILSON of California. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I include the following article from the Los Angeles Times written by Henry J. Taylor:

PRESIDENT SPOKE STIRRING WORDS ON CUBA, BUT WHERE ARE DEEDS?

(By Henry J. Taylor)

In Washington, the American Society of Newspaper Editors cheered the President of the United States as he finished a speech. The date: April 20, 1961, 3 days after the Cuba fiasco.

The President stated: "On that unhappy island the news has grown worse instead of better. But let the record show that our restraint is not inexhaustible."

"Should it ever appear that the inter-American doctrine of noninterference merely conceals or excuses a policy of nonaction, if the nations of this hemisphere should fail to meet their commitments against outside Communist penetration, then I want it clearly understood that this Government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations, which are the security of our Nation."

"Should that time ever come, we do not intend to be lectured on 'intervention' by those whose character was stamped for all time on the bloody streets of Budapest, nor would we expect or accept the same outcome which this small band of Cuban refugees must have known they were changing. There are lessons from this sobering episode for all to learn. Some are clear today."

"First, it is clear that the forces of communism are not to be underestimated, in Cuba or elsewhere."

"Second, it is clear that this Nation must take an even closer and more realistic look at the menace of external Communist intervention and domination in Cuba. The American people are not complacent about Iron Curtain tanks and planes less than 90 miles from our shores. The evidence is clear and the hour is late."

"Third, and lastly, it is clearer than ever that we face a relentless struggle in every corner of the globe. The armies * * * serve primarily as the shield behind which subversion, infiltration and a host of other tactics steadily advance. * * * Our security may be lost without the firing of a single missile or the crossing of a single border. We intend to profit from this lesson."

It was a fine speech. The great applause of the Society of Newspaper Editors spoke the Nation's enormous approval. Those who question whether we know what we should do about Cuba should reread what the President said.

We have the words, we have the policy. We do not have the followthrough. Where is the deed?

Is Cuba farther away than 90 miles today? Are there fewer Iron Curtain dangers there now to let us be complacent? If "the evidence is clear and the hour is late" in April 1961, what would you call the evidence and the hour in September 1962?

Where, oh, where, in our inaction is the "profit from this lesson?" What action was there in the President's statement August 29 and September 4?

The chief decay in any nation's strength is the loss of morale resulting from failing to do what it says (and knows) it must do. Nations can stand many strains, but they cannot stand the loss of moral fiber either in their leaders or within themselves.

Editors everywhere, citizens everywhere, should ask, "What happened, Mr. President, to that speech?"

There is nothing more dangerous for America than to be a paper tiger.

Cleanest City in Louisiana

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. T. A. THOMPSON

OF LOUISIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, September 14, 1962

Mr. THOMPSON of Louisiana. Mr. Speaker, it is always a privilege to observe development in the areas which one represents, and especially is it gratifying when the leaders of our municipalities and their organizations make monumental efforts to give our people a better place in which to live and rear their families.

Only recently, the city of Jennings, La., has earned a most significant title under the guidance of Mayor John L. Conner and the city council, along with the inspired assistance of civil-minded residents, in that for the third consecutive year—despite hardy opposition from